The Scrubber is intended to stop Bad Parents from enjoying the successes of their toddlers and children, whilst giving them positive moodlets whenever something negative happens to those children instead. It is also meant to block negative moodlets associated with these negative events, and to replace them with pleasant moodlets. In a sense, all current positive moodlets from parents are reversed to negative, and all negative become positive.
(Action Tuning files) loot_buff_social_SharedBigNews_Tense (whitelisting Hates Children and Bad Parent, so the buff appears), loot_buff_social_SharedBigNews_Happy (blacklisting Hates Children and Bad Parent, so the buff never appears), loot_caregivers_ToddlerBirthday, loot_caregivers_ToddlerBirthday (both blacklisting Hates Children and Bad Parent, so the buffs never appear)(Buff Tuning files) buff_Toddlers_CTYAE_ThatWasCute, buff_Toddlers_GrowingSoFast_Happy, buff_Toddlers_CTYAE_GrowingUp, buff_HadBaby, buff_Object_Baby_Mourn, buff_WitnessedRescuedNeglectedChild, buffs_Mentoree_Toddler_Proud, buff_Toddlers_CTYAE_ToddlerBirthday, buff_Toddlers_BirthdayCelebration, Buff_SharedBigNews_Happy. (all are blacklisted for Hates Children and Bad Parent, so the buffs never appear)(Interaction Tuning files) mixer_social_OfferToFeelBaby_Invite_targeted_Friendly_alwaysOn_Pregnancy, mixer_social_ShareBigNews_targeted_Friendly_alwaysOn_pregnancy (Hates Children and Bad Parent are blacklisted, so they will never give positive responses, and will reject offers to feel a pregnant sims baby even if they are romantic partners)
The allegations typify the case as one sometimes referred to as a \"resident child molester\" case. (See People v. Van Hoek (1988) 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 814, fn. 1 [246 Cal. Rptr. 352].)fn. 3 The fact pattern these cases often present is that the defendant has lived in the same residence as the child victim over a long period of time, and is accused of frequent or routine molestation during that period, but the child cannot remember the exact dates and places the molestation occurred. The due process concerns raised by this factual pattern are (1) the sufficiency of the notice of offenses charged, (2) the defendant's ability to assert an alibi defense, and (3) the ability of the jury unanimously to agree on particular acts supporting particular charges. (See People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 814-816.) Here, the first concern-inadequate notice of the charges-moved the trial court to sustain the demurrer to the original information, and it later dismissed all but two counts of the amended information because it believed the record gave neither due process notice nor presented sufficient evidence of particular charged acts.
The amended information charges defendant with 145 counts of molestation of the minor victim N., occurring over the time period from June 1, 1983, until March 3, 1984, during all of which time defendant and N. lived in the same household. The statutory charge in each count is section 288, subdivision (a), lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child, except the final count which charges a violation of section 288a, subdivision (c), forcible oral copulation. The trial court ruling dismisses all but counts 144 and 145. [221 Cal. App. 3d 1194] These counts are equally not specific as to dates. Count 144 charges one count of section 288, subdivision (a), upon N. between February 24, 1984, and March 3, 1984, and Count 145 charges one count of 288a, subdivision (c), occurring on a Friday night between September 1, 1984 and December 1, 1984, when the victim's mother was ill at home. In the remainder of the information, each charge of section 288, subdivision (a), alleges an act of lewd and lascivious conduct within section 288, subdivision (a), committed upon N. during a specified one-week period, without further factual detail. Typical is count one, which charges that defendant committed an act proscribed by section 288, subdivision (a), upon N. \"on or about and between the 1st day of June, 1983, and the 7th day of June, 1983, in the County of Santa Clara * * * \"
As stated above, cases of this type present tensions between the defendant's due process rights, as they have been traditionally viewed, and society's wish to punish the resident child molester for his conduct. When the victim cannot pinpoint dates of the offenses, a dilemma exists: if the law requires specificity, a guilty person may escape liability; if specificity is not required, the district attorney is free to charge any number of offenses, and there is danger of erroneous conviction or at least overcharging and a disproportionate sentence.
The Legislature has recently attempted a partial solution to this problem in its enactment of section 288.5, the resident child molester statute. That statute imposes a sentence of 6, 12, or 16 years for molestation occurring during a 3-month period, and requires proof of regular access to the victim and at least three acts of substantial sexual conduct with the child during that period. Unanimous agreement on particular acts is not required. ( 288.5, subdivision (b).) The constitutionality of this statute has not yet been determined. It does not address nor necessarily alleviate the problem of whether dates of the substantial acts must be specifically pled or proved. Although the statute may be of some help in a given case, it does not appear available to a court as a solution in cases where, as here, the charged acts predate the statute. (Nor would the statute be of assistance where the district attorney elected to proceed under the older statutes, unless section 288.5 be found to have preempted other offenses against minors.)
 We agree with the decisions which have observed that the defendant's alleged problem in fashioning an alibi defense if dates are not specifically pleaded is chimerical in most of these cases. (E.g. People v. Obremski (1989) 207 Cal. App. 3d 1346, at pp. 1352-1353 [255 Cal. Rptr. 715]; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 787; People v. Dunnahoo (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 572 [199 Cal. Rptr. 796]; People v. Coulter (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 506 [257 Cal. Rptr. 391].) Credibility, not alibi or wrongful identification, is likely to be the issue in these cases. (People v. Dunnahoo, supra; People v. Moreno, supra.) We agree with Obremski, supra, and Moreno, supra, that \"Van Hoek and its progeny place 'a misguided emphasis on the right of resident child molesters to rely on alibi as a defense.' \" (Moreno, supra, at p. 787.) Further: \" 'Van Hoek is incorrect because it attempts to fit the crime to the defense instead of fitting the defense to the crime. In cases where the child molester lived with the victim for an extensive, uninterrupted period and therefore had continual day and night access to the vulnerable child, neither alibi or wrongful identification is likely to be a reasonable defense.' \" (Ibid., citing Dunnahoo, supra.)
[2c] Some of the cases which have permitted charging the resident child molester without specificity as to dates have distinguished Castro and Williams, supra, in terms of the lessened importance of the information now that a preliminary hearing is required. Here, however, there is the additional distinguishing circumstance that the victim has testified to a routine practice. We do not believe that either Castro or Williams requires more than we have here, namely, testimony as to a daily practice occurring over an identified period of time.
Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to vacate its order dismissing, pursuant to section 995, all but two counts of the amended information, and to make a different order denying defendant's motion to dismiss. We treat the ruling on the demurrer as moot. This opinion shall be final as to this court immediately (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(d)), because this matter involves a child victim and may be entitled to trial priority. ( 1048, subd. (b).) Our stay of trial herein is vacated, effective when this opinion becomes final.
FN 5. If the trial court was simply attempting to eliminate some of the counts in order to avoid undesirable overcharging or an excessive sentence, we point out that the task of making the punishment fit the crime is that of the Legislature and not of the courts except in very unusual instances (such as when cruel and unusual punishment may be argued). We sympathize with the trial court's attempt to pare this prosecution down to a manageable size. If the punishment for resident child molesters is to be a virtual life sentence, that choice should be made by the Legislature, not the prosecution. Section 288.5, supra., indicates the Legislature probably would not choose that route.
FN 6. Possibly, cases of this nature may be appropriate candidates for the continuous conduct exception which has been applied in other areas of criminal law and has permitted conviction upon testimony to a pattern of conduct which by its nature is continuing. (Such cases include, most pertinent to this case, child abuse, People v. Ewing (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 717 [140 Cal. Rptr. 299], and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, People v. Lowell (1946) 77 Cal. App. 2d 341, 346-348 [175 P.2d 846]; as well as spousal battery (People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 220, 224 [206 Cal.Rptr. 516]); pimping (People v. Lewis (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 455, 460-462 [143 Cal. Rptr. 587, 3 A.L.R.4th 1185]); and harboring a felon (People v. Gunn (1987) 197 Cal. App. 3d 408 [242 Cal.Rptr. 834]). However, the doctrine has been rejected in a case of sodomy and oral copulation occurring in a continuous crime spree. (People v. Madden (1981) 116 Cal. App. 3d 212, 218 [171 Cal.Rptr. 897]).) People v. Luna, supra, states that the Castro and Williams decisions have foreclosed the application of the doctrine to resident child molester cases. (See People v. Luna, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 749.) 1e1e36bf2d